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The Path of International Law,  
by Anthony D'Amato,*  1 J. Int'l Legal Stud. 1-19 (1995) 
 
Abstract:  Is there a need for yet another student-edited international law journal? Practicing attorneys retrieve rele-
vant articles when working on cases with international law issues, although they may be oblivious to the name of the 
journal or the prestige of the law school that supports it. For student editors, serving on a new international law journal 
is not just an intellectual experience; it is an empowering one.  The more one looks into custom and treaty and the other 
sources of international law, the more one finds complexity and intellectual challenge. 
 





  Is there a need for yet another student-edited international law journal? At the present time 
there are approximately seventy student-edited international law journals in the United States. FN1 
Those who think the number is too high usually talk about saving the forests. Presumably they 
would not get agreement from the approximately thirty student-edited environmental law journals. 
These journals might say that paper can be reprocessed, that increasingly the contents of their jour-
nals are being entered into computer retrieval systems, thus cutting down on the number of physical 
copies that are printed, and that in any event, forests are a renewable resource if cared for and man-
aged properly. 
 A somewhat more plausible argument for those who think that there are too many law reviews 
is that there is not enough "law" that can be usefully discussed in all of those journals. If these crit-
ics are referring to American law, their position is false for at least two reasons; if they are referring 
to international law, it is false for a third reason as well. 
 First, law is a pervasive phenomenon; the closer you look, the more fine-meshed it is. If we 
consider the huge number of cases that are reported in the various state and federal law reporters (a 
number that is increasing faster than the increase in student-edited law journals), and if we reflect 
on the fact that the vast bulk of the written material involved in all of these cases (motions, briefs, 
interrogatories, discovery transcripts, trial transcripts) does not appear in the published reports, we 
find that published legal research has barely scratched the surface. There is no danger of law [pg2]  
"running out" if we just consider all cases, in their full aspect, that have been resolved in court. But 
additionally, reported cases are only a fraction of all lawsuits; most legal controversies are settled 
before they ever get to court, and over ninety percent of those that do get to court are settled eventu-
ally. Yet all of these settled cases are also "law," awaiting any scholar who wants to probe deeply 
into any given legal area or issue. 
 Second, there are vast areas of law that scholars have more or less overlooked. For example, 
family law is one of the most obvious and most prominent fields in all of law, yet only a couple of 
decades ago it was the most neglected course in the law-school curriculum. Not only are family law 
cases numerous in comparison to other litigated areas of the law, but they are also of huge import to 
the parties. It is hard to imagine a commercial law case being as important to the individuals litigat-
ing it as is a child-custody dispute to the contesting parties. If the over 400 student-edited law re-
views were to announce that henceforth they would only publish articles and notes on family law, 




 My third reason applies to international law: there is hardly any danger of exhausting its ever-
increasing supply. International law is growing even faster than family law out of sheer necessity. 
Not only are there more countries in the world than ever before, and not only are these countries 
increasingly literate and law-minded, but in fact international-law issues are spreading out into do-
mestic cases. The reasons are obvious: world trade is expanding, foreign investors are coming to our 
shores and starting small and big businesses, many of the products we buy have been built abroad 
and shipped here (and nearly all of the products we buy have some component that was built 
abroad), the U.S. economy and stock markets increasingly reflect the state of business abroad, the 
number of persons coming here seeking U.S. citizenship as well as the number of tourists are rap-
idly increasing, our citizens are becoming more involved in foreign economies, in addition to other 
signs of a "shrinking world" too numerous to mention. 
 We are living in globally revolutionary times. The Cold War has ended abruptly, the Marxist 
and Socialist alternatives to capitalist economies have been discredited thoroughly, and suddenly 
everyone wants a share of the material riches that the world has to offer. Rising expectations have 
swamped political concerns in nation after nation. States that only a few years ago seemed to be 
captured by intractable political antagonisms, such as South Africa and Northern Ireland, suddenly 
are awakening to the fact that their citizens would rather spend their energies "getting and spending" 
than fighting each other.[pg3]  
 In a way, the Japanese experience has become the role model for the world. After World War 
II, as a condition of peace, Japan was permanently demilitarized. The vast creative energies that, in 
decades prior to the mid-thirties, had resulted in a huge Japanese military force (which invaded 
China in the 1930s and took on the rest of the world in the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941), now had 
only one place to be rechanneled—business enterprise. The result: Japan became extremely rich and 
successful and has lived in peace with its neighbors. It slowly dawned on everyone that the world in 
which we are now living is not driven by military or even political factors, but by an economic capi-
talist revolution that gains in momentum daily and appears irreversible.FN2 The rise of capitalism 
inevitably is accompanied by the rise of litigation as a peaceful means of resolving the issues that 
capitalism spawns—contract and trade disputes, banking regulation, domestic and foreign taxation, 
corporate law, bankruptcy, product liability, property transfers, and the like. 
 Even more important than the discrediting of communism is the global change in attitude to-
ward women. Half of the human race has lived either in varying degrees of servitude or in second-
class citizenship in most countries for most of human history. Equal rights for women is still an un-
attained ideal in many countries, but we are in the midst of revolutionary progress presenting a chal-
lenge to international law of unprecedented proportions. In my own view, it is not the content of 
international human rights norms that need to be drastically changed; rather, our task is to apply 
these norms to countries which still do not respect them.FN3 The task of  [pg4] translating human 
rights norms so that they can be made directly applicable to women in pervasively patriarchal socie-





 So much for a direct response to the question that opened this essay. A more interesting inquiry lies 
behind the question itself. Who are the people questioning the need for yet another student-edited 




can law schools. They maintain their skepticism in the face of support for international law journals 
from all the other relevant constituents in the law school world. Law school administrators, for ex-
ample, support the new journals by providing money and office space. Students support these jour-
nals with their labor and by competing for editorial assignments. Alumni applaud the increase in 
prestige for the law school. Practicing attorneys retrieve relevant articles when working on cases 
with international law issues, although they may be oblivious to the name of the journal or the pres-
tige of the law school that supports it. The only skeptics in the crowd are my colleagues—the law 
professors in American law schools. 
 Why they question the need for these journals can be broken down into two basic motives: 
 (1) The first motive, which I partially share, is that law professors are increasingly fearful of 
lowered standards for publication of legal articles. They believe that there are not enough good 
scholars writing enough good articles to fill 400-plus student-edited journals four issues a year, in-
cluding seventy international law journals. They fear that the result is the publication of many sub-
standard articles. In faculty evaluations of colleagues for promotion or tenure, the mere fact that the 
candidate presents a publication list of law review articles is no longer accepted as a test of merit; it 
is indeed too easy for an author to find a journal which would publish just about anything as long as 
it is festooned with footnotes. 
 Curiously enough, it is not just the large number of law reviews that has contributed to a pro-
fessorial perception that getting an article published is no longer the accomplishment it was thirty 
years ago. What has also [pg5] happened is that the elite group of law reviews has largely self-
destructed. Rather than distancing themselves in terms of quality from the proliferating number of 
law reviews, they have embarked on a mission of publishing politically correct and faddish articles. 
Many of these articles are substandard, even incoherent, excuses for scholarship. The student edi-
tors apparently believe that they have a substantive mission: to publish the right kind of articles ra-
ther than articles that are well-reasoned. 
 The leading law reviews are, in my judgment, the worst offenders. They are adrift with the sub-
stantive fads of the day. Since their editorial boards change completely over a two-year span, and 
since the new crop of editors have even more disdain for "classic" legal scholarship than their 
predecessors, faddism in the choice of articles gains momentum with each passing year. 
 The net result is that it has now become hard to name the "leading" law journals. A subscriber 
to what used to be a top law journal has no guarantee of quality in the articles published in that 
journal. An article of good quality is just as likely to surface in any of the 400 student-edited law 
reviews. If one were to compile a list of the most influential law-review articles in all of the various 
fields of law, today's list would include articles from a wide and diverse group of law reviews in 
contrast to the situation thirty years ago when the leading articles in all the fields of law could be 
found in a handful of elite journals. Consequently, in considering the credentials of any given pro-
fessor (who might be a candidate for appointment to the faculty or a candidate for promotion or ten-
ure), discerning law faculties nowadays are no longer likely to be impressed by the names of the 
journals that have published the candidate's work. 
 On closer analysis, the situation of which law faculties are really complaining is that they have 
lost a formerly accessible standard of scholarship—a candidate's publication record. Since it is no 
longer possible just to look at a candidate's vita and determine whether the candidate is a good scho-




work. And this, I submit, is the real reason for faculties rebelling against the proliferation of law 
reviews. I have found that many law professors are notoriously lazy when it comes to reading arti-
cles outside their own professional field. They prefer just to look at a candidate's list of publications. 
Now that these publication lists are becoming meaningless, law professors must put in the effort to 
read the candidate's work and reach an independent assessment of its merit.  [pg6]  
 To my way of thinking, this is one of the healthiest developments that could have occurred. I 
have always been unimpressed by the fact that a candidate for a law teaching job has published one 
article or ten articles. I have never understood the European mentality that a professor is somebody 
who writes a book—any book, the narrower and less accessible, the better, as if the book itself is the 
absolute criterion of a professorship. To the contrary, I have always been in favor of actually read-
ing the candidate's work. FN5 One could never be sure, even thirty years ago, that a leading law re-
view might nevertheless make a mistake in publishing a given article. So even then it was never 
adequate or fair just to look at the list of a candidate's publications and where they were published, 
and make a decision on those simple facts alone. By reading and assessing the quality of what the 
candidate has written, then and especially now, the faculty committee is taking the candidate seri-
ously. It is putting its own effort into the assessment rather than relying on what other people have 
said about the work or the mere fact that a leading journal has published it. 
 But the main reason why the proliferation of law reviews is a healthy development has nothing 
to do with narrow issues of promotion and tenure in law schools. It is that more good articles will be 
published than ever before. To be sure, so will more bad articles. Still, the bad articles are not caus-
ing harm to anyone; no one is required to read them. What is really important is the fact that with an 
increasing number of publication outlets, the number (not necessarily the percentage) of good and 
useful articles will increase. In the past, some meritorious manuscripts never saw the light of day 
because of the shortage of outlets coupled with occasionally bad decisions by editorial boards. To-
day, those meritorious manuscripts are more likely to find a publication outlet. To put my argument 
in its strongest terms: even if the rapidly growing number of student-edited journals means that 
more bad articles are going to be published, and even if it means that there will be a higher percent-
age of bad articles compared to good ones (but of course this is not a necessary result), nevertheless, 
all is justified if a larger absolute number of good articles are published than ever before. The world 
benefits from an increasing quantity of good scholarship even if there is an increasing amount of 
bad scholarship. We have computer retrieval methods for ferreting out the useful articles, FN6 so 
there is no substantial  [pg7]  possibility that the useful articles will be drowned in a sea of poorer 
articles. 
 Of course, the foregoing does not imply that a new editorial board, such as the board of this 
Journal of International Legal Studies, has a mandate to publish anything that comes its way with-
out the obligation to exercise editorial selectivity. For although we have an expanding marketplace 
for law-review articles, it is still a marketplace. Consumers will begin to get an impression of edito-
rial competence over time. If a new journal has a high percentage of useful articles, its own value in 
this expanding marketplace of ideas will increase and gain momentum, garnering prestige for its 
home institution. 
 I would, however, like to give a word of unsolicited advice to future editors of this and other 
journals that could help them better serve the profession of international law. Word-retrieval com-
puters cannot make qualitative choices. The user gets a kitchen sink of references which has to be 




lished scholarship. Indeed, in other professions, such as the physical and biological sciences, the 
problem has been addressed and the solution they have arrived at is the one which I, with no origi-
nality, suggest here. Appearing in the journals of these other professions, with increasing frequency, 
are the "review article" and the "bibliographical note." These contributions discuss, summarize, and 
evaluate all the recent articles (and books) that deal with a particular subject. They serve a useful 
distributive purpose in the academic marketplace; a kind of "Consumer's Reports" evaluation of the 
literature. These review articles are best when their author has no personal axe to grind and strives 
for fairness and comprehensiveness in evaluating the worth of current literature. Student editors of 
international law journals should take the lead in encouraging review articles of this sort. 
 The best way to obtain such review articles, I suggest, is to identify a likely assistant professor 
of international law and agree in advance to publish that person's review article. Such an advance 
commitment tends to go against the grain of student editorial boards. Student editors prefer to make 
the publication decision when they can choose among several competing manuscripts in hand. 
However, I suggest that they will need to realize that a law professor is not going to do all the work 
required to read a  [pg8]  substantial portion of the literature and review it without first obtaining a 
commitment that the resulting manuscript will be published. Such commitments can lead to the pub-
lication of worthwhile quantitative guides to the burgeoning literature on international law. And 
over time, they can form a sort of internal evaluative review of the developing literature. 
 (2) So far I have only discussed the first motive as to why some law professors view with alarm 
the proliferating number of student-edited law reviews. The second "why" relates to the specific 
field of international law. For even as some law professors bemoan the increasing number of stu-
dent-edited law journals devoted to law in general, we hear a portion of those law professors (pro-
fessors who teach in fields other than international law) especially decrying the increasing number 
of student-edited international law journals. 
 The underlying reason here is likewise one of laziness. But it is laziness of a different order. It 
is the lassitude that comes from having devoted one's life to a particular subject matter and obtain-
ing, through hard work, an expertise in that subject matter, only to be threatened by a new and 
strange subject matter. Today, international law tends to be an unwelcome intruder into the law 
school curriculum. The majority of the faculty has expended its learning curve to embrace the latest 
theories about contracts, torts, property, antitrust, corporations, criminal law and criminal proce-
dure, tax, constitutional law, securities regulation, administrative law, environmental law, profes-
sional responsibility, trial practice, family law and evidence. International law, with its strange lan-
guage and strange sources, presents a frontal challenge to the learning amassed in all the other cur-
ricular subjects. The mainstream professors fear that international law will rob them of students, 
research support, and prestige within the academy. 
 Of course, I am painting with a broad brush. I know a number of superb corporations teachers 
who are introducing multinational corporations into their courses, tax teachers who are introducing 
world tax problems into their courses and seminars, antitrust teachers who spend time on extraterri-
torial enforcement, environmental law teachers who are talking about global ecosystems, and so 
forth. But it is nevertheless true that domestic law courses overwhelmingly dominate current law 
school curriculums. The current demand for more "practice" and "clinic" courses also tends to 
crowd out international law courses. FN7 International law, in this company, is more or less a "bou-




 A similar curricular lethargy has occurred in the past. In the 1950s, criminal law was the un-
wanted and unloved course in the law school curriculum—what lawyer, after all, wanted to spend a 
lifetime dealing with criminals? The Warren Court revolution of the 1960s changed everything. 
There was a huge growth in criminal law courses in the 1970s and 1980s. Consider as well Law and 
Economics: it progressed from a feared subject in the 1970s, to an embraced subject in the 1980s, to 
an enough-already subject in the 1990s. 
 There is always faculty resistance to new courses because the faculty itself is not expert in these 
fields (since by definition they are new courses), and feels threatened by newcomers bearing new 
and strange jargon. But the threat to the establishment is even greater in the case of international 
law, because it threatens the existing expertise not only in substantive areas of U.S. law but in the 
entirety of U.S. procedural and evidential training. To many professors, international law is alien 
law, and their reaction is to enact an implicit Proposition 187 against the foreign intruders. 
 Of course, most law professors would not overtly agree with what I have just said. Law profes-
sors are experts in instant rationalization (some people say that is what lawyering is all about). If 
you charge them with being threatened by international law, they will reply: "Threatened? Not at 
all. There is nothing to be threatened about. From an intellectual point of view, international law is 
nothing new. It is just ordinary torts and contracts applied to foreign countries. Would a theoretical 
mathematician be threatened by someone who teaches applied mathematics?" 
 This rationalization is not just used for defensive purposes by law professors who are ques-
tioned as to why they oppose expanding the international law wing of the law school building. It is 
also used by professors who actively advise first-year students in course selection. These professors 
are not necessarily trying to guard their own turf; they include well-meaning colleagues in our pro-
fession who just happen to have little or no acquaintance with the study of international law. They 
tend to tell their advisees that international law is not an intellectually important [pg10] subject. "If 
you're good at regular law," they are likely to tell their student advisees, "you can do international 
law." 
 This rationale bothers me a great deal, not just for the obvious reason that it is a self-serving ra-
tionale invented by people who have not themselves acquired expertise in international law and 
hence are not really in a position to advise others about it, but for a deeper reason. What troubles me 
is the grain of truth that it contains. Much of what passes for "international law" in law journals is 
itself ill-informed about its own subject matter. A professor of a domestic law course who reads 
such an article is likely to be unimpressed by "international law." For we must admit that interna-
tional law appears to be accessible to any writer without special training in the subject. International 
law just seems to be too easy. All a writer seems to need to do to write an essay on a topic in inter-
national law is to look up any textbook on international law, stick in a few well-chosen words about 
the sources of international law, and then proceed with "ordinary" legal analysis in the rest of the 
essay. The resulting article will seem, to perceptive readers who themselves have no grounding in 
international law, to be a normal, unexceptional law article—nothing but torts and contracts in an 
exotic setting. 
 Let me suggest an analogy. Suppose a college instructor teaching an introductory course in 
French asks his students to write an original poem in French. If the students are already fairly good 
at writing poems in English, they will simply apply their training in poetry to the new language they 
are learning and proceed to write "French" poetry. Suppose that the poems are then recited in the 




matter, then for all anyone in that class would know, good French poetry had just been created in 
the classroom. But if someone were to refer this matter to a professor of French literature and ask 
her to evaluate the students' poems, she might say they were terrible as French poetry (even if she 
concedes that they are quite good as an exercise for students in an introductory French class). She 
might say, for example, that the so-called poems are ignorant of the special expertise of French 
grammar and metric form that comes only from thorough study of the roots of French language and 
French literature, including poetical sources in classical and even archaic French. In poetry it is not 
just the thought that matters, it is the way it is expressed. We cannot really expect students who are 
taking an introductory course in French to be able to write good, nuanced French poetry even if 
some of those students have poetic talent. 
 Why then should we expect lawyers who are well-trained in the domestic law of the United 
States to be able to deal with the quite different [pg11] language of international law? Although the 
language of international law appears to use the same words as the language of domestic law, those 
words have a different meaning, a different pedigree, a different set of connotations. The language 
of international law looks like regular legal language—so much so that non-international lawyers 
can be completely fooled by it. In fact, the important connotations, the nuances, the specialized ex-
pertise that is reflected in the precise choice of the international legal terms can be readily spotted 
by persons who are expert in international law. The well-trained international lawyer can readily tell 
whether an article purporting to be about "international law" is part of a linguistic-cultural tradition 
that contains its own special meanings and references, or whether it is just a surface-plausible, er-
satz version of international law. And these "expert international lawyers" I refer to are not just 
American lawyers. International law is a truly international language. The articles published in our 
American student-edited international law journals are read—and will increasingly be read—by in-
ternational lawyers all over the world. Those international practitioners and scholars will be judging 
whether what we are publishing are genuine contributions to the field or simply knocked-off mer-
chandise. 
 It is sad but true that most foreign lawyers will have a better grounding in international law than 
American lawyers. International law is a required subject in the law school curriculum in most 
countries in the world, but not in the United States. Editors of our international law journals should 
realize that the most important consumers of their product will have a greater sophistication about 
international law than most American readers. We should not just apply our own standards to arti-
cles on international law that we send out into the world market; to do so is like the students in my 
hypothetical introductory French class applying their own standards to assess the merits of their 
classmates' "French poetry." 
 When ersatz articles are published, they reinforce the view of American law professors that in-
ternational law is not a field of law at all—just ordinary law applied to transnational events. Accord-
ingly, I will now try to defend the proposition that so far I have only asserted: that the language of 




 Professors of domestic law could reasonably ask why international law should be considered 
to be a separate intellectual discipline. How can its language be described as distinctive when the 




tom" and "treaty." Many writers who know little about international law feel that  [pg12]  they 
know the meaning of these words—custom is just a pattern of behavior, and a treaty is just a con-
tract between states. 
 Although there is a grain of truth in these assertions, here as in many places a little learning is a 
dangerous thing. If one focuses on these simple assertions, one is more likely to be blinded than as-
sisted in writing about international law. Even if "custom" is a pattern of behavior, the problem is 
how to identify the relevant patterns of state behavior out of all the things that states do. Why do 
some state practices constitute "custom" for international law purposes and other similar-looking 
state practices amount to nothing more than mere comity or courtesy? How and when can a single 
incident, not even amounting to a pattern of behavior, generate custom? Why is it that certain pat-
terns of behavior create legal expectations that future behavior must conform to those patterns? And 
how do we account for changes in the norms if all future behavior must legally conform to the pre-
vious patterns? These questions all interlock. To be able to argue that a certain pattern of state con-
duct amounts to "custom" requires grappling with all these questions. 
 These questions are not easily answered. One cannot simply consult a popular textbook on in-
ternational law for a "nutshell" answer. Indeed, many of the popular textbooks' discussions of how 
to find custom are vague, ambiguous, and tautological. "Custom" is a centuries-old process—a 
complex metarule regarding the ascertainment of primary international rules—and not a one-line 
definition. And if one needs a thorough grounding in international law to be able to appreciate what 
is meant by "custom," an almost equal amount of study must be devoted to understanding "treaties." 
 Although treaties resemble contracts in some respects, they are much more than contracts. For 
one thing, they are "relational" contracts instead of "discrete" contracts. FN8 The notion of clausula 
rebus sic stantibus [pg13] in treaties is quintessentially a relational notion; it would wreak havoc 
with ordinary contracts as typically studied by students in American law school introductory con-
tracts courses. Treaties depart radically from contracts in respect to the way reservations to multilat-
eral conventions are validated and interpreted. Consider also that a treaty is a source of law to non-
parties—something that does not exist with respect to commercial contracts in American law. FN9 
 Terms like "custom," "treaty," "general principles," "jus cogens," "U.N. resolutions," and so 
forth, have a special and nuanced meaning in international law that is unavailable to scholars who 
have not studied international law. Although these are ordinary words that seem to have an ordi-
nary, plain meaning, the appearance is deceptive. It is quite clear to a person who has studied inter-
national law whether the author of a given article in an international law journal really knows and 
uses the international law meaning of these words, or whether, like a parrot, the author is simply 
repeating the words. One does not write good French poetry by first writing a good poem in Eng-
lish, then translating it word-for-word into French. One cannot write international law scholarship 
by thinking through a problem in the language of domestic law, then translating it into plausible in-
ternational law equivalents. Such isomorphisms simply do not exist because the same word may 
have a different meaning when we change the context from domestic law to international law. 
 The reason that such isomorphisms do not exist is more than a problem regarding translation. 
For the language of international law is itself rooted in an entirely different legal system. It is a sys-
tem that lacks a World Constitution, World Legislature, World Executive, World Administrative 
Branch, or even an International Court of Compulsory Jurisdiction.FN10 To some observers it 
seems less "authoritative" than domestic law because it lacks these domestic features. But this "au-




thoritativeness. Domestic law must employ the monopolistic power of the state to force people to 
comply with its norms.[pg14]  Is the picture of sheriffs hitting people over the head what is meant 
by a mature legal system? 
 International law proceeds more on the basis of persuasion than force; it appeals more to the in-
tellect than to the desire to avoid physical pain. It is no less "law" for this reason, for as I have tried 
to argue elsewhere, it has its forceful sanctions which are not always obvious. FN11 The more one 
looks into custom and treaty and the other sources of international law, the more one finds complex-
ity and intellectual challenge. International law reflects accommodations among states, whereas 
domestic law (as it becomes more statutory) does not necessarily reflect accommodations among 
citizens. International law is constantly in a state of flux and refinement, whereas domestic law 
comes to an abrupt end when the Supreme Court rules. The international legal system is a democ-
racy; domestic legal systems are dictatorships of law. I believe that international law is more intel-
lectually challenging than domestic law because domestic law has final, "authoritative" institutional 
answers that tend to stifle creative thinking and analysis. 
 International law has its own language rooted in its own system. As a human, verbal activity, it 
transforms itself into a way of thinking about itself. To be sure, all of law school training is training 
in the acquisition and use of a specialized language. A good lawyer is one who has acquired a facil-
ity in the specialized language of the law—a facility that often is marked by a sort of disdain for le-
gal gobbledygook and a striving to say things simply and clearly. But don't be misled by this. A tax 
expert who advises you in simple, clear language, has in the back of her mind the Internal Revenue 
Code and all its linguistic complexities. A good article on international law need not use the special-
ized language of international law. Yet it will be clear to the informed reader that the evidence se-
lected and adduced in the article, the way the article is structured, the kind of reasoning that goes 
into it, and the ultimate persuasiveness of the author's conclusion, all attest to the author's mastery 
of the specialized language and reasoning of this field of law. 
D. 
 
 Understanding the language of a field of study is a prerequisite to contributing to the ad-
vancement of a field, but of course it is only a [pg15] prerequisite. A writer also has to "add value" 
to the subject; FN12 otherwise there would be little point in writing about it. In some cases the val-
ue added consists only of a new way of organizing its subject matter or a new set of citations of 
previous works. But in most cases the writer wishes to add new thoughts and arguments (or in the 
field of science, new experimental results). These new thoughts and arguments are typically the 
product of the writer's dissatisfaction with existing work in a particular subject-area of the field 
coupled with a desire to improve either the quality of the field or the quality of human life or both. 
 Motivation is the first step. In the field of international law, for example, a writer may simply 
realize at some point in time that she is very interested in some particular issue in the field. Further 
thought—and some preliminary reading and conversation—convinces her that there is room for im-
provement of the existing scholarship on that issue. On further examination, she may find that the 
existing scholarship is either insufficient when measured in light of the issue's importance, or it is 
logically or technically flawed. She may also begin to question the values of the authors of the ex-




real world. She may feel that international law ought to be reshaped to address and help solve these 
real world concerns. 
 I raise the issue of motivation, even though a writer surely has the right to be motivated by any-
thing at all, because at the present stage in international law scholarship there is a tendency for a 
writer to import her own motivating ideals directly into the content of the international law about 
which she is writing. To the writer, it may seem to be a short step between saying that international 
law ought to protect particular rights of real people in the real world, and claiming that, properly 
interpreted, international law does protect these rights. One can be greatly tempted to take the step. 
In international legal discourse, as in all legal discourse from time immemorial, the rhetorical leap 
from "ought" to "is" has been found to be immensely persuasive.FN13 For although readers of legal 
essays, including judges and government officials, may be rather indifferent to a writer's [pg16]  
claim that the law ought to say this or that, those same readers will pay close attention when a writer 
claims that the law in fact says this or that. Because of this striking effect upon readers, a writer 
feels empowered when she utilizes this rhetorical device in the service of changing the minds of 
readers and thus effecting a real change in the real world. 
 To the casual observer, international law may appear more susceptible than domestic law to the 
rhetorical move from "ought" to "is." Domestic law is governed, people think, by the force of au-
thoritative statutes and precedents, thus constraining writers to dissociate their own views of what 
the law should be from their description of existing law. The professors of domestic law whom I 
mentioned earlier in this essay are apt to be in the forefront of those who claim that international 
law is more malleable because it lacks authoritative statutes and precedents. They believe that this 
malleability simply shows that international law lacks authenticity as a legal field. 
 Again, there is a grain of truth in these assertions. To the extent that writers on international law 
fail to respect the constraints of international law scholarship, they cheapen the coinage of the sub-
ject. To the extent that it is easy for a writer to import her own ideals about what international law 
should be into an essay that concludes by claiming that present-day international law in fact embod-
ies those ideals, the effect of her essay may be to contribute to the downgrading of the entire enter-
prise of international law scholarship. 
 Despite this grain of truth, I believe that international law is not inherently more malleable and 
susceptible of incorporating a writer's own views than is domestic law. Writers on domestic law, no 
less than writers on international law, import into their essays their own ideals by using the rhetori-
cal device of claiming that the law, properly interpreted, supports those ideals. They just do it in a 
less obtrusive fashion. They do it by carefully selecting the cases and statutes that they marshal in 
support of their ideals, de-emphasizing cases and statutes that seem to support the opposite position, 
and engaging in stretched and sometimes far-fetched interpretations of legal materials in order to 
make them appear to say what the writers want them to say. To be sure, this process of hammering 
the law into a desired shape is good training for student writers who are preparing for a career in 
litigation or negotiation. Indeed, the ultimate arena for bending malleable law is the courtroom, 
where a pair of attorneys appearing on opposite sides of a case each hammer and twist the same un-
derlying [pg17] body of law in order to make it appear to support the position of their clients. 
 A professor of domestic law might make the following reply to my argument: that even if legal 
writers engage in the same rhetorical move (from "ought" to "is") in domestic law as they do in in-
ternational law, nevertheless it is harder to do so in domestic law because of its density of statutes, 




and hence easier for the writer to manipulate. My response—not just for the purpose of this argu-
ment, but genuinely reflective of my life's work in the field of international law—is that interna-
tional law is no less "dense" than domestic law, it just seems that way. 
 International law seems thinner for the simple reason that greater effort is required to find it 
than is required to find domestic law. Domestic law is found in readily available case reports, stat-
utes, regulations, and so forth—now more available than ever before due to the advent of computer 
retrieval technology. But the records of international law still remain largely buried in files and ar-
chives of foreign offices. These are the records of state diplomatic correspondence, embodying the 
assertion, counter-assertion, and resolution of millions of international claims. Someday, perhaps 
these records will be entered and stored on CD-ROMs and made available to scholars all over the 
world. When they become available, the "density" of international customary law, and the vast 
range of subjects it covers, will be evident to the most casual observer. In the meantime, one can get 
a glimpse of the depth of legal materials available in state foreign offices by looking at a representa-
tive case brought before the International Court of Justice. In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case 
of 1951, FN14 for example, both Great Britain and Norway searched their foreign office files and 
produced a vast amount of documentation concerning Norway's territorial sea claims dating back to 
the eighteenth century, Great Britain's practices vis-a-vis Norway in reaction to some of these 
claims, and ensuing diplomatic exchanges between the two countries. The Court looked over this 
massive evidence in reaching a decision as to the existence of norms of customary law that would 
resolve the dispute. FN15 No one reading the case can fail to be impressed at the richness of evi-
dence that was brought to bear on the matter. Similar evidentiary density can be found behind most 
of the thousands of transboundary interactions that occur daily among the 190  [pg18]  states in the 
world today. All that is lacking is the will and financial resources to dig up this archival material. 
When a disputed issue is sufficiently important, as it tends to be in any contested case before the 
International Court of Justice, the evidentiary material is quickly produced. 
 To be sure, the typical author of an article on international law does not have the time or re-
sources to mine the archives of a nation's foreign office, much less the archives of all the foreign 
offices of all the countries of the world. But the job can be roughly approximated. Newspapers con-
tain accounts of many of the significant international diplomatic claim-conflicts, followed up by 
stories of how they were resolved. Each day, more of these international newspapers are added to 
the libraries of computer retrieval systems. To be sure, a newspaper is only a secondary source of 
customary law. But citing a newspaper story is far better—and much more persuasive—than citing 
no source other than the writer's own mind. 
 When some people shrug off customary international law as "that vague stuff," they betray a 
lack of understanding of what custom is and how it can be found. I hope that with the passage of 
time, and the increase of scholarly writing on international law, this primitive view of our subject 
will be replaced by more sophisticated searches into the practices of states. 
E. 
 
 For student editors, serving on a new international law journal is not just an intellectual ex-
perience; it is an empowering one. A writer or an editor is actually engaging in the process of refin-
ing international law, of helping to pin it down, of finding patterns of custom that others may have 
missed. But there is an entrance fee. One must pay the price of hours of study of the sources and 




least a few substantive areas of international law. All this must be accomplished before one starts to 
write or edit an article. If this preliminary homework is skipped—if a writer believes that all that is 
necessary is an idea plus a quick look at a textbook on international law to pick up the jargon—then 
the result will be that readers who know international law (readers from all over the world) will 
simply exclude that writer's work from the ongoing path of international law dialogue, and have a 
lesser opinion of the journal that published it. 
 My final sentence is a summary of the most important point I have tried to make in this essay. I 
address it to editors and contributors to the Journal of International Legal Studies and to all other 
editors and contributors to student-edited international law journals. It may sound [pg19] paradoxi-
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FN1. See MICHAEL HOFFHEIMER, 1995 DIRECTORY OF LAW REVIEWS AND SCHOLARLY LEGAL 
PUBLICATIONS. The same directory lists approximately 170 student-edited law reviews devoted to 
general legal subjects, and the same number of student-edited journals devoted to special legal sub-
jects other than international law. In total, at present count, there are over 400 student-edited law 
journals in American law schools. 
FN2. Along with the capitalist revolution is a symbiotic development in the democratization of 
countries and an increasing respect for human rights. I discussed these interlocking themes in an 
article written during the Cold War. See Anthony D'Amato, Are Human Rights Good for Interna-
tional Business?, 1 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 22 (1979). 
FN3. The norm of "equality," for example, cannot be easily invoked as a criticism of the status 
of women in Islamic countries, because of the defense that although women are not equal in some 
matters (relating to law, freedom of movement, divorce), men are unequal in other compensating 
matters (men must present their wives with a dowry, which may be kept intact because husbands are 
obligated to provide one hundred percent of the economic support of their wives). Whether this is a 
truly countervailing inequality may depend upon one's cultural point of view. For further discussion, 
see Anthony D'Amato, The Primacy of Individual Freedom, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 
260, 260-67 (Anthony D'Amato ed., 1994); Anna Jenefsky, Egypt's Reservations to the Convention 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra, 
at 130, 130-39. 
FN4. For a glimpse of the complexities involved in speculating about the application of a few 
articles of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women to the partially Is-
lamic nation of Egypt, see Jenefsky, supra note 3. 
FN5. Not necessarily everything that the candidate has written. My own strategy is to ask the 
candidate to name the very best thing that he or she has ever written, and then to read it. I am more 




FN6. With improved software, it will be possible to tell at a glance how often a given retrieved 
article or book has been cited. More difficult, but still within the realm of existing technology, a 
weighting can be given to a given article in terms of how frequently it has been cited by articles 
which in turn have been frequently cited. This procedure would yield a crude quantitative measure 
of the scholarly impact of a given article. 
FN7. However, in big cities, students should demand of their law-school clinics that they be 
given opportunities to help immigrants to the United States. The United States Immigration and Na-
turalization Service (INS) often treats newly-arrived persons quite badly, and the INS also has a low 
tolerance for lawyers. Most lawyers don't like to do INS work for this reason (and also because im-
migrants usually have little money). Hence, INS work is precisely the area where law students can 
do the most good and at the same time obtain practical experience in international law. 
FN8. The analytical distinction between relational and discrete contracts has only recently come 
into American contract law, pioneered by my Northwestern colleague Ian Macneil. I am a great ad-
mirer of Professor Macneil's work, but for me his main points were anticipated decades ago by ana-
lyses made regarding the interpretation of treaties in international law. Indeed, I would suggest that 
the reason Professor Macneil's work on contracts has struck American scholars of contract law as so 
innovative is that they have never studied the way treaties have been analyzed in international law. 
The "relational" theory of contracts has a lot to learn from treaties. But I would hasten to add that 
international lawyers may also benefit in their understanding of treaties from Professor Macneil's 
work on relational contracts. 
FN9. However, treaties have a striking analogue to the early formation of the common law of 
contracts, especially the "law merchant" in the judicial decisions of Lord Mansfield. For further dis-
cussion see INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 3, at 51-84, 89-101, 121-45. 
FN10. Personally, I would not want a world government; I enjoy the diversity and freedom that 
exists in the various nations of the world, a freedom that I think could be stifled if there were one 
central government telling everyone what to do. 
FN11. See Anthony D'Amato, Is International Law "Law'?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOL-
OGY, supra note 3, at 37. 
FN12. The phrase "add value" is unusual in talking about scholarship, though of course it is a 
common phrase in European countries which have a "value added tax" or VAT. In those countries, 
each contributor to the manufacturing process of a product is taxed on the market value of its con-
tribution. 
FN13. A move in the opposite direction—from is to ought—has been called the "naturalistic fal-
lacy." It is a standard rhetorical device of political theorists who are influenced by natural law. Per-
haps what I have described in the text—the move from ought to is—can be called a version of the 
naturalistic fallacy. However, I hesitate to give it this same label lest it become a source of confu-
sion. 
FN14. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18). 
FN15. For an account, see Anthony D'Amato, Finding Custom in an Incident, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 3, at 58. 
 
 
